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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD ALTER, State Treasurer
and Custodian of the Uninsured
Employers' Fund and the
Industrial Commission of Utah
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

*
*
*
*

Case No. 870013-CA
Priority Number 6,

v.
HALES SAND AND GRAVEL and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
of Utah,
Defendants/Appellant.

*
*
*
*

RESPONDENTS• BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Randi Hales died on July 31, 1986, as a result of injuries
sustained in a compensable accident while in the employ of
defendant/appellant. Hales Sand and Gravel.

Randi Hales was not

married, had no children and left no persons dependent upon her for
support.

Hales Sand and Gravel was insured at the time of the

accident for all liabilities resulting from claims under the Workers
Compensation Act.

The company's insurance carrier, the Workers

Compensation Fund of Utah, sent a letter to the Industrial
Commission on August 19, 1987, accepting liability for the no
dependent death benefit as provided for in Section 35-1-68(2)(a),
U.C.A. (1953, as amended).

(R. p. 1 and 3). Upon receipt of the

letter, the Industrial Commission entered an Order for payment of

$30,000.00 into the Uninsured Employers Fund.

Hales Sand and

Gravel (hereinafter referred to as Hales) filed a Motion for Review
which was denied by the Industrial Commission on December 31, 1986.
(R. p. 7-8.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The no dependent death benefit was originally enacted in 1917
with the first Worker's Compensation Act in Utah.

It has been used

to provide funding for the second injury fund and the Uninsured
Employers1 Fund.

John Hales, the "owner" of Hales Sand and Gravel,

was instrumental in proposing and lobbying the 1987 Utah Legislature
for passage of a bill which eliminates the no dependent death
benefit but continues other funding sources for both of these
funds.

The passage of that bill does not evidence that the benefit

was unconstitutional.
The creation and funding of the Uninsured Employers1 Fund was a
proper exercise of the legislature's police power in carrying out
the intent and purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act.
•"•The Order listed Hales Sand and Gravel and/or the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah as defendants. The listing of Hales Sand
and Gravel as a defendant in the Order does not mean that it is
primarily responsible for the payment of the no dependent death
benefit. Hales Sand and Gravel has contingent liability in the
event the insurance carrier defaults. See American Fuel Co. v.
Industrial Commission. Utah. 187 P. 633 (1920). Since the defendant
insurance carrier admitted liability and did not appeal the Order
awarding benefits coupled with the fact that there is no evidence
that the carrier is likely to default on the Order, it is highly
unlikely that Hales Sand will be required to make payment of any
portion of the $30,000.00.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PAYMENT OF A NONDEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT
IS NOT A TAX AS DEFINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
Defendant Hales argues that the nondependent death benefit
provided for in Section 35-1-68(2)(A), U.C.A. (1953, as amended)
should be categorized as a tax and not as "compensation".

In

support of its argument. Hales notes that the benefit "is for a
public purpose rather than a payment directly to an employee or his
dependents as a result of the employee's injury or death."
(Appellant's brief p. 4)

Even though the benefit is not a payment

made directly to one of Hales' employees, the nondependent death
benefit has been defined by the Supreme Court of Utah as
compensation under the Workers Compensation A£t.
As originally enacted in 1917, the compensation system
... gave dependents of a workman killed in the
course of his employment the option pf either
suing under the wrongful death statute or
accepting the death benefits provided by the
compensation act. By necessity the statute was
framed in the alternative form, because Article
XVI, Section 5, [of the Utah Constitution]
precluded a statutory provision makihg death
benefits ... the exclusive remedy.
Star v. Industrial Commission, Utah 615 P.2d 436
(1980) at p. 438.
In 1921, Article XVI, Section 5, was amended by the addition of
the concluding clause to read as follows:
The right of action to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death, shall never be
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not
be subject to any statutory limitation except in
-3-

cases where compensation for injuries resulting
in death is provided for by law, (Emphasis
supplied)
The amendment was essential if workers compensation was to be
the exclusive remedy in all types of compensable injuries including
those resulting in the death of an employee.

With the passage of

the amendment, nondependent heirs and personal representatives of
deceased employees were no longer allowed to sue the employer at
common law.

That was the holding in the leading case of Henrie v.

Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, 113 Utah 415, 196 P.2d 487
(1948), an action brought by a nondependent father in the state
district court for the wrongful death of his minor son.

The son had

died of injuries sustained in a work related accident while employed
by the defendant. Rocky Mountain.

In as much as the son was

"unmarried, childless and left no dependents", the defendant was
ordered to pay $1,000.00 into the state treasury as a no dependent
death benefit.

The father sought to recover damages and maintained

that since the $1,000.00 payment to the state treasury was "not a
benefit to him," it was not "compensation" under either the 1921
constitutional amendment or under the workers compensation act.
Since it was not compensation, the plaintiff argued, the exclusive
remedy provisions of workers compensation law did not operate to
prevent the bringing of a wrongful death action under Article XVI,
Section 5, of the Utah Constitution.
In reasoning that the no dependent death benefit constitutes
"compensation" the Supreme Court stated that:
Workmen's Compensation Acts were designed to
correct what had become a generally recognized
-4-

evil. Prior to their enactment, the personal
representatives or heirs of a workman killed in
the course of his employment could not recover
for his death, unless negligence on the part of
the employer could be established. Moreover, the
defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule,
freguently defeated the cause of action. Even
where recoveries were had. they usually came only
after months or years of expensive litigation,
and were largely reduced by attorney's fees and
other costs. On the other hand, where recoveries
were allowed, sympathetic juries frequently
returned grossly excessive verdicts
The intention of the acts, then, Was to secure
workmen and their dependents (not heirs or
personal representatives) against becoming
objects of charity, by making reasonable
compensation for calamities incidental to the
employment, and to make human wastage in industry
part of the cost of production.
Compensation is a concept wholly different
from that of damages. Damages are based upon
fault, are generally limited only by the findings
and conscience of the jury, and in death cases
are payable to heirs or personal representatives
without regard to dependency. Compensation, on
the other hand, generally has no relation to
fault, is fixed or limited by statute, and is
payable to dependents only.
i
Plaintiff contends that because the money [no
dependent death benefit] paid by defendant or its
insurance carrier into the state treasury did not
benefit him, it was not compensation within the
meaning of Article XVI. Section 5 of the
Constitution. Viewed in the light of the history
of that section of the Constitution, and of the
Workmen1s Compensation legislation, the
contention is untenable.... "Compensation." as
used in the amendment to the Constitution, means
the same as it is used and defined in the
compensation act, i.e. any payment reguired by
the act to be made to a workman or to his
dependents, or for their benefit, or into the
state treasury for the special purposes of the
compensation act. This includes ... payments
into the state treasury as provided by the
act.... (Emphasis supplied)
Henrie. supra, at p. 426-428
-5-

In the more recent case of Star v. Industrial Commission, supra.
the Supreme Court of Utah cited Henrie. supra,

with approval in a

broader challenge to the no dependent death benefit.

In Star, the

deceased employee's mother made application for death benefits in
the Industrial Commission under Section 35-1-68. even though she was
not dependent on the employee.
Industrial Commission.

Her claim was denied by the

The Supreme Court noted:

On appeal, plaintiff characterizes the death
benefits paid under the Workmen's Compensation
Act as funds resulting from the wrongful death of
an individual, and she claims it constitutes an
unjust enrichment to pay such benefits to the
special fund of the State of Utah rather than to
the estate or family of decedent.
Star, supra, at p. 437
While not specifically addressing the "unjust enrichment"
portion of plaintiff's argument, the Supreme Court upheld the
Industrial Commission and reiterated its earlier holding that the
definition of "compensation" as contained in Section 35-1-44(6).
U.C.A. (1953. as amended) includes payment by an employer or his
insurance company of the no dependent death benefit to the state
treasury for the "special fund".
Hales did not attempt in its brief to distinguish the Henrie or
Star cases or the resulting characterization of the no dependent
death benefit as "compensation."

Admittedly, those two cases deal

with a slightly different type of challenge than is being made here
by Hales.

However, cases involving challenges to the statute made

by employers or insurance carriers on constitutional grounds have
uniformly held that the no dependent death benefit is a permissible
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exercise of a state's police power and does not offend equal
protection or due process principles.

This result is reached

regardless of whether or not the court categorizes the benefit as a
tax or as compensation.
POINT II
THE NO DEPENDENT DEATH BENEFIT IS AN APPROPRIATE
EXERCISE OF THE STATE'S POLICE POWER AND
AS SUCH DOES NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The provision for a no dependent death benefit was enacted with
the first Utah workers' compensation law in 1917.

The funds so

collected were used exclusively for the Second Injury Fund until
2
1984.

In the very early case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial

Commission, (1921) 58 Utah 314, 199 P. 152, 18 A.L.R. 259, the
Supreme Court, citing with approval from Plaintiff's brief said:
Bearing in mind that "the cost of human
wreckage may be taxed against the.industry which
employs it," this cost of human wreckage ought
not to be borne by the state or the taxpayers of
the state as such, for the primary obligation
rests upon the industry which employs labor.
Notwithstanding this fact, the state of Utah in
1917, when the Industrial Act was passed,
provided, without expense to employers, a
tribunal for the administration of the act ...
including salaries of [the commissioners and
support staff which] ... might have been imposed
solely upon the industries employing labor. As
against these contributions of the state for the
benefit of industries employing labor, can it be
justly contended that the demands of the statute
that each industry pay into the state treasury
[the no dependent death benefit] ... in the event
of the remote contingency of an employe's death
2

Originally designated as the "special fund" and later the
"combined injury fund" the purpose of that fund has remained
substantially the same. The 1984 amendments created what is now
known as the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
-7-

by accident without dependents is either
discriminatory or unjust? Can it be justly
contended that the classification is arbitrary or
capricious, or that the statute is a denial of
the equal protection of the laws? We think not.
We do not understand that a classification, in
order to avoid objections as to its
constitutionality, should be absolutely uniform
and equal in every respect as between the parties
composing the class. That equality is not always
practicable is recognized in many cases decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
especially in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61. at page 78, 31 Sup. Ct. 337. at
page 340 (55 L.Ed. 360. Ann. Cas. 1912C. 160).
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Van
Devanter. says:
"The rules by which this contention must be
tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of this
court, are these (1) The equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from
the state the power to classify in the adoption
of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely
arbitrary. (2) A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that
clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it
results in some inequality. (3) When the
classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time of the law was
enacted must be assumed. (4) One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary."
Citations omitted. Salt Lake City, supra, at p.
155.
At the time Salt Lake City was decided, the no dependent death
benefit was required of any "employer not insured in the State
Insurance Fund...."

The Utah Court noted that it was within the

legislature's power to require that all employers insure with the
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State Insurance Fund therefor
[i]n the absence of some logical reason or
authority to the contrary, we feel compelled to
hold that the state had the power to name the
terms and conditions upon which employers might
insure the payment of compensation to their
employes even though there was an apparent
discrimination in favor of the state.
Salt Lake City, supra, at p. 157
Soon after Salt Lake City was decided, the provision exempting
the State Insurance Fund from payment of the no dependent death
benefit was changed to require contribution by all employers or
their carriers-

In analyzing the constitutionality of the no

dependent death benefit after the change, the Utah Supreme Court
again upheld both the requirement that the benefit be paid and the
purpose for which it was to be used in United Air Lines Transport
Corporation et al. v. Industrial Commission et al.. 151 P.2d 591
(Utah 1944):
... The fundamental principles of the law of
workmen's compensation were unknown to the people
and the times that produced our common law.
Workmen's compensation is the natural product of
necessity. The numerous hazards which
accompanied the growth of industry with the
development of power-driven machinery antiquated
the common law. Need for a new method and means
of giving greater protection and security to the
worker and his dependents against injury and
death occurring in the course of employment gave
birth to legislative law. This creature of the
legislature with improvements and refinements is
now commonly called workmen's compensation.
Its existence is not due to the needs nor
influence of employes alone. It has been
promoted and sustained for its benefits to both
capital and labor and the general good done
society by its usefulness. It bases its right to
existence in the police power of the State. Park
Utah Consol. Mines Co. et al. v. Industrial
-9-

Comm. , 84 Utah 481, 36 P. 2d 979. Workmen's
compensation is the result of compromise made
between master and servant, chaperoned by
society, for the benefit of all.
United Air Lines, supra, at p. 594-595
The Court noted that although there still existed some confusion
on "extraterritorial jurisdiction" issues,
... the right to enact workmen's compensation
laws is now well settled. The statutes have
repeatedly been held to be constitutional....
Also, such laws providing for creation and
maintenance of a special fund as set up by the
Utah statute, 42-1-64, U.C.A. 1943, [now section
35-1-68] have, almost universally, been held
constitutional. (Emphasis supplied)
United Air Lines, supra, at p. 595
After citing with approval the U. S. Supreme Court decision in
the case of Sheehan Co. v Shuler, 265 U.S. 371. 44 S.Ct. 548, 68
L.Ed. 1061, 35 A.L.R. 1056, the Utah Court went on to hold that
... the creation of a special fund where the
employe dies without dependents is not taking
property without due process of law.... The
great weight of the decisions of our appellate
courts during the last twenty-five years is that
an employer or insurance carrier is not deprived
of property without due process of law by a
workmen's compensation act requiring compensation
for death of an employe. This court has held
that the workmen's compensation statute is not
unconstitutional as a denial of egual protection
of laws, nor as taking property without due
process. (Emphasis supplied)
United Air Lines, supra, at p. 595
In the leading United States Supreme Court case, Sheehan v
Shuler, supra, the Court reviewed a New York statute which created
two separate funds for the benefit of employees.

One of the funds

was in most respects identical to Utah's second injury fund and the
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other fund was for the maintenance of "employees undergoing
vocational rehabilitation."

Payment was reguired only of employers

or their insurance carriers in "certain employments classed as
hazardous,"

Those certain employers were reguired to pay $500.00

into each fund in the event an employee died with no dependents.
The Sheehan Company was "in one of the hazardous occupations" and
challenged the payment of the benefit on the grounds that the law
was "in conflict with the 14th Amendment, and that the awards made
thereunder deprive them of their property without due process and
deny them the egual protection of the laws."

The U.S. Supreme Court

first examined the purpose of the two "special funds" and held that:
... The use of such special funds for such
purposes is an additional compensation to the
employees ... [which] is neither unjust nor
unreasonable....
We do not think that the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment reguires that such additional
compensation to injured employees of the
specified classes should be paid by their
immediate employers, or prevents the legislature
from providing for its payment out of general
funds so created....
The payments thus reguired are not unfair and
unreasonable in amount. The aggregate for the
two funds is $1,000. This is much less than the
maximum payment which may be reguired according
to the scales in case the employee leaves
survivors entitled to death benefits, and seems
not to exceed, if it eguals. the average amount
of the payments reguired in such cases.
... Nor are these provisions in conflict with the
egual protection clause. The contention of the
companies is that the prescribed awards are in
the nature of a tax imposed upon the happening of
a contingency, and are of unegual application;
that is that they are imposed only upon such
employers as happen to have employees who are
killed without leaving survivors entitled to
-11-

compensation. However, this is not a
discrimination between different employers, but
merely a contingency on the happening of which
all employers alike become subject to the
requirements of the law. All are required to
contribute, under identical conditions, to these
special funds.
Citations omitted, Sheehan, supra, at p.
1059-1060.
Defendant Hales asserts in his brief that "the only difference
between employers who must pay into the Fund and those who are not
required to do so is the paying employer who is unfortunate enough
to hire an employee who dies without dependents;" and "should the
employee die with dependents, the employer is not responsible for
the payment of the $30,000.00."

Hales argues that this creates an

arbitrary classification which deprives him of equal protection of
the law because he must pay money which would not be due had his
employee left dependents.

This is not true.

Defendant Hales

completely ignores Section 35-l-68(e) which reads as follows:
If there are wholly or partly dependent
persons at the time of death and the total amount
of the awards paid by the employer or its
insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to
the termination of dependency, including any
remarriage settlement, does not exceed $30,000.
the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay
the difference between the amount paid and
$30,000 into the Second Injury Fund provided for
in Subsection (1).
It is clear from this provision that $30,000.00 is the minimum
payment due in the event of a compensable death.

And. as in

Sheehan. supra. "[t]his is much less than the maximum payment which
may be required ... in case the employee leaves [dependants]." An
employer or. as in this case, its insurance carrier pays a minimum

-12-

of $30,000.00 in every death case regardless of the existence of
dependents.

Thus the class here is all employers whose employees

die from compensable injuries.

Employers whose employees have no

dependents are not required to pay more money, only the minimum.
Hales next argues that the nondependent

cjeath benefit is

discriminatory and thus deprives him of equal protection because an
uninsured employer "is subject to liability urtder this statute only
if his employee dies with no dependents."
14.)

This is also untrue.

(Appellant's brief at p.

When an employer is uninsured, he

becomes liable for all workers compensation benefits including death
benefits payable to dependents.
Section 35-1-45. U.C.A. (1953, as amended) states:
Every employee ... who is injured, ... by
accident arising out of or in the course of his
employment, ... shall be paid compensation for
loss sustained on account of the injury....
Section 35-1-58, U^C.A. (1953, as amended) states:
Any employee, whose employer [is uninsured] ...
may, in lieu of proceeding against his employer
by civil action in the courts ... file his
application with the commission for compensation
... and the commission shall hear and determine
such application for compensation a$ in other
cases; and the amount of compensation which the
commission may ascertain and determine to be due
to such injured employee ... shall be paid by
such employer.... (Emphasis supplied.)
Hales seems to argue that the Uninsured Employers1 Fund pays for
all compensable injuries suffered by employees of uninsured
employers.

Defendant states:

Utah Code Annotated. Section 35-1-57, maKes
uninsured employers liable in a civil action for
any injury received by an employee, as an
alternative to reimbursement for the injury by
-13-

way of the Uninsured Employers1 Fund (Defendant's
brief p. 15).
This argument ignores the clear language of Section 35-1-107
subsections (1) and (3). (U.C.A.. 1953, as amended) which provides:
(1) There is created a Uninsured Employers Fund
for the purpose of paying and assuring. ...
workers' compensation benefits [to employees]
when ... [their] employer ... becomes or is
insolvent. ... or otherwise does not have
sufficient funds ... to cover workers'
compensation liabilities under this chapter....
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other
benefits paid or payable to ... an employee ...
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the fund, by
subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and
benefits of the employee ... against the employer
failing to make the compensation payments.
(Emphasis supplied.)
These sections make it clear that an uninsured employer is
liable for at least the same benefits as an insured employer.

The

Uninsured Employers' Fund only becomes liable when the uninsured
employer is "insolvent."

In fact, an uninsured employer may be

liable for damages far in excess of the benefits allowable under the
workers' compensation laws in the event an employee elected to sue
at common law.

Section 35-1-57. U.C.A. (1953. as amended) is not

"an alternative to reimbursement for the injury by way of the
Uninsured Employers' Fund" but an alternative to the limits imposed
upon applicants in an action before the Industrial Commission.
Section 35-1-58. gives the injured employer the option to file with
the Industrial Commission.
Employers who shall fail to comply with the
[mandatory insurance] provisions of Section
35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of
-14-

this title during the period of noncompliance,
but shall be liable in a civil action to their
employees for damages suffered by reason of
personal injuries arising out of or in the course
of employment caused by the wrongful act. neglect
or default of the employer or any of the
employer's officers, agents or employees, and
also to the dependents or personal
representatives of such employees where death
results from such injuries.
Thus nondependent heirs or the personal representative of a
deceased employee could sue at common law for wrongful death even if
they were not dependent on the employee if the employer were
uninsured.

Those were the types of suits disallowed by the holdings

in Henrie and Star.

Had the employers been uninsured in those

cases, the nondependent beneficiaries would have prevailed.
Hales cites Yosemite Lumber Co. v. Industrial Acci. Commission.
187 Cal. 774, 204 Pac. 226 (1922), in support of his argument that
no dependent death benefits are a tax and as such are
unconstitutional.

A careful reading of Yosemite reveals that the

California Supreme Court found the benefit unconstitutional on the
basis of the California state constitution which differs
dramatically from Utahfs in this respect.
The California Constitution was amended in 1918 to provide for
the enactment of a workers' compensation system "to create and
enforce a liability on the part of any or all persons, or the
dependents of their workmen for injury ... sustained by the said
workman in the course of their employment."

The California Court

held that that constitutional provision did,
... [N]ot authorize the creation of a liability
on the part of any person to compensate the
workmen of other persons, or the dependents of
-15-

workmen of other persons. The phrase "their
workmen" necessarily confines the persons to be
compensated to workmen who are in the employ of
the person who is made liable.
Yosemite, supra, at p. 998.
Thus the Yosemite Court found that the statute was
unconstitutional because it went beyond a specific grant of
authority in the California Constitution.
limited the power of the legislature.

This specific grant

And notwithstanding the

Court's conclusion in the case, the Court recognized the
legislature's right to provide a fund for the benefit of those
disabled in industry.
It may be conceded that, under its general
powers, the legislature might provide a fund for
the benefit of persons disabled in industry in
this state, and commit the administration of the
fund to the Industrial Accident Commission, and
might also levy a tax in some form to raise such
fund. (Emphasis supplied)
Yosemite, supra, at p. 1000.
Finally, the court in Yosemite, supra, distinguished
State Industrial Commission v. Newman, 222 N.Y.
363, 118 N.E. 794, [because] ... [t]he
Constitution of New York contains no provision
limiting the power of the legislature of that
state ... such as are contained in our
[constitution]....3
Yosemite, supra, at p. 1000
3

The California Constitution was amended in 1972 to cure this
defect. California now provides for a no dependent death benefit in
the amount of $75,000.00. The funds so generated go to that state's
eguivalent of the second injury fund. California Labor Code,
Sections 4701, 4702 and 4706.5.
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The Utah Constitution, not unlike New York's, contains no express
provision against the legislature's passing a no dependent death
benefit further distinguishing the Yosemite case from these facts.
Such was the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court in Horn Ace.
Ins. et al. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona et al., 269 P. 501
(1928).

There the Court examined a no dependent death benefit for

the use of a rehabilitation fund.

With a "constitutional mandate

somewhat similar to" the California provision analyzed in Yosemite,
the Arizona court refused to follow the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court.

The Arizona Court noted that the California Court

... [B]ased its ruling upon the ground that the
express grant of power to require employers to
compensate their workmen and their dependents
implies that the power to compel them to
compensate the state for the benefit of the
workmen of others is not granted. "The language
of neither one of these parts of the section
shows or expresses," the court said. "an intent
to add another liability to that expressly
stated," and it held that the maxim, "The
expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another," was applicable.
There is no question but that this view is
correct, when the power to enact legislation does
not exist independently of the Constitution,
because a provision in that instrument directing
the Legislature to enact particular legislation
necessarily carries with it no authority to enact
something not included therein. But, when such
power does exist, irrespective of the
Constitution, ... the Legislatures of the states
have all legislative power, except that withheld
from them by the state Constitutions, or
surrendered to the federal government. In Clark
v. Boyce, 20 Ariz, 544. 185 P.136, tphis court
said:
"The Legislature has all power n<>t prohibited
to it by the state or federal Constitution."
-17-

In Inspiration Consolidated Cooper Co, v.
Mendez, 19 Ariz. 151, 166 P.278, it used this
language:
"The legislative power of the state is not
controlled nor controllable by simple mandatory
directions given by means of constitutional
provisions which direct action, but do not
restrict action on the part of the Legislature.
When the Legislature is not constitutionally
restricted, it may act or not as the occasion may
seem proper, and in acting may pass any law the
Legislature deems for the welfare of the state,
unless prohibited by some positive constitutional
provision, and all such laws not so prohibited
are valid."
That the Legislature could, under its general
powers, enact a law requiring employers to pay
the state a certain sum for the promotion of the
vocational rehabilitation of those disabled in
industry, the same as it could a Workmen's
Compensation Law, both being within the police
power of the state, there is no question....
Horn Ace., supra, at p. 503-504
The petitioners in Home Ace., supra, urged the Arizona Court to
adopt a position not unlike Hales is urging here, namely to declare
that the no dependent death benefit is a tax and unconstitutional.
The Arizona Court reasoned that the benefit is
[N]ot a tax on property at all, but a part of the
compensation the employer, the insurance carrier,
or the state compensation fund is compelled to
pay, when the employee killed in the course of
his employment leaves no dependents. It is just
as much a part of the expense the employer must
bear or his insurance carrier assume as the
amounts to be paid directly to the employee or
his dependents, because it is imposed for the
same general purpose, the promotion of the
welfare of those disabled in industry, and in the
exercise of the same power, the police power of
the state. The fact that it reaches the injured
employee for whom it is intended through a
somewhat different channel that is, is paid into
the state treasury and held in a special fund, to
provide in the manner stated for the promotion of
the vocational rehabilitation of persons disabled
-18-

in industry does not give it a tax status
different in any degree from that of the
compensation that must be paid directly to
employees or their dependents. Being imposed for
the same purpose, and in the exercise of the same
power, it is necessarily the same kind of tax as
other compensation, and under all the authorities
this is not a tax on property, but a tax on
occupation or business.
The third principal objection to thje
constitutionality of the act is that it violates
the provisions of the Constitution designed to
secure equal and uniform taxation of property for
public purposes. As the charge laid on the
persons engaged in the industries named in the
act is a pecuniary burden imposed by public
authority, it partakes of the nature of a tax,
and in the language of a distinguished judge
discussing a similar question, "for many purposes
might be so spoken of without harm." But it is
manifest that it is not a "tax" in the sense the
word is used in the sections of the constitution
to which reference is here made. The accession
to the public revenue, general or local, is
authorized or aimed at. The purpose of the
exaction is entirely different*
It is to be
used, not to meet the current expenses of
government, but to recompense employees of the
industries on whom the burden is imposed for
injuries received by them while engaged in the
pursuit of their employments. It is the
consideration which the owners of the industries
pay for the privilege of carrying them on. It is
therefore in the nature of a license tax, and can
be justified on the principle of law that
justifies the imposition and collection of
license taxes generally.
Under the great weight of authority, a tax on
occupation, business, etc., is not, in legal
contemplation, a tax on property, which falls
within the inhibition imposed by the usual
constitutional provision in relation to
uniformity of taxation.
Horn Ace., supra, at p. 504-505
The Arizona Court next focused its attention on the due process
and equal protection questions:
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... The argument is that this provision is
arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory, in
that it provides for a special classification,
consisting of only those employers coming under
the Workmen's Compensation Act who employ persons
without dependents, but with the right to claim
compensation, and that it is not required that
the beneficiaries of the payments thus made be
employees of the persons whose payments create
the fund, nor the dependents of such employees,
but merely that they be employees disabled in
industry. We think it perfectly plain that,
though subdivision 9 does provide that only those
employers who happen to have an employee without
dependents killed shall make the payments in
question, and that the beneficiaries of the fund
may be employees of employers other than those
making the payments, neither of these facts
render it arbitrary or discriminatory, because
the contingency up on the occurrence of which the
employer becomes liable, is just as applicable to
one employer as another. And perhaps it was
thought that it would tend to place all employees
upon a more nearly equal footing in the matter of
securing employment, since the Legislature may
have entertained the idea that employees without
dependents would be given the preference by some
employers, in the absence of such provision,
inasmuch as the accidental death of a workman
without dependents would mean that the employer
would pay the funeral expenses and nothing more.
In Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission. 58
Utah. 314. 199 P. 152. 18 A.L.E. 259. the Supreme
Court of that state reached the same conclusion
upon a statute identically the same in effect as
... the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state.
Horn Ace.. supra. at p. 505-506
POINT III
THE CREATION OF THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'
FUND IS AN APPROPRIATE EXERCIZE OF THE STATE'S
POLICE POWER
Previous cases have dealt with no dependent death benefits
payable to a fund similar to Utah's second injury fund or to a fund
used for rehabilitation purposes.

By amendment in 1984 the Utah
-20-

legislature created what is now known as the Uninsured Employers*
Fund and diverted the no dependent death benefits to that fund.

In

1986 the legislature again amended the statute to provide a one time
infusion of additional funding for the Uninsured Employers Fund by
way of a premium tax.

The premium tax as provided for in the 1986

amendments was to be collected for fiscal year 1986-1987 only.

The

1987 legislative amendments abolished the no dependent death benefit
as a source of funding but provided for the continuation of the
premium tax as a perpetual funding source for the Uninsured
Employers Fund.

Hales does not make a direct challenge to the

legislature's power to create the Uninsured Employers1 Fund nor to
provide funding through a premium tax for such a purpose.

He does

state however that the Uninsured Employers' Fund "would not be
necessary if the Industrial Commission took the time and effort to
enforce the [mandatory insurance] provisions of Title 35."
(Appellant's brief at p. 16)

On page 17 of hjis brief. Hales asserts

"[t]here would be no need for the fund or at least a lesser need if
the Industrial Commission would enforce the provisions provided in
Title 35."

There is absolutely no evidence in the record of this

case to support the accusation.

Hales argues that if the criminal

laws were enforced there would be no crime.

fThis Court should not

engage in the type of speculation needed in reference to that
issue.

Additionally, the Industrial Commission investigates over

4,000 suspected uninsured employers yearly since the creation of the
Uninsured Employers Fund provided the funding necessary to conduct
those investigations.

Finally, the standards under which the
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legislation should be judged have been set out in the cases earlier
cited.
The Uninsured Employers Fund was created in 1984 in response to
the insolvency of a certified self-insured employer.

That

insolvency, which occurred in 1983, resulted in the loss of workers1
compensation benefits by many injured employees.

Their plight

brought to focus a problem which had plagued the Industrial
Commission since it was established seventy years ago.
An employee is often unable to resume employment after an
injury.

Outstanding medical bills can result in additional

financial pressure.

Most private health insurance policies

specifically exclude coverage for on-the-job injuries.

Health care

providers often refuse all but emergency care when a patient is
without insurance and unable to pay.

An injured employee, unable to

work and in need of medical care, is among

society's most

disadvantaged citizens if there are no workers' compensation
benefits available to satisfy his ongoing expenses.

Where his

employer has no insurance, or inadequate insurance, the employer is
ultimately responsible for workers' compensation benefits under the
Act.

When the employer is unable to pay because of insolvency, the

injured employee must shoulder the entire burden of financial and
physical loss.

If the employee is unable to pay, the responsibility

may become that of welfare or charity.
A majority of the states now provide benefits for the employees
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of uninsured insolvent employers.

4

In all states except

California, the funds are provided by insured employers either
through a premium tax or a death benefit.

Respondents are

unaware of any case where these funds or the source of funding has
been successfully challenged.

As was noted earlier, the proper test

lies with the state1s police power as outlined by the U. S. Supreme
Court in Lindsley. supra.

Hales has failed to show an abuse of

discretion on the part of the legislature in creating a fund to pay
for those who otherwise might become wards of the state.
CONCLUSION
The provision for a no dependent death benefit is a
constitutionally permissible exercise of the legislature's police
power and is neither unjust or unfair.

To overrule the Industrial

Commission and find that the benefit should apate to the Workers1
Compensation Fund of Utah at the expense of the Uninsured Employers1
Fund will not alleviate the suffering of Hales, the father.

The

Order of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this %'

day of June. 1987

u.
' Suzan Pixton
^2X

Attorney for Respondents

4

State Workers' Compensation Laws. U.S. department of Labor.
July 1983.
California's Uninsured Employers' Fund deceives it's funding
from the general fund. Workers' Compensation Benefits, Worrall &
Appel. 1985. p. 150-155.
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ADDENDUM A

A-1

35-1-68- Second Injury Fund — Injury causing death —*
Burial expenses — No dependents, payments to
Uninsured Employers' Fund — Payments to de-"
pendents.^
(1) There is created a Second Injury Fund for the purpose of making
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2. This fund shall succeed to
all monies heretofore held in that fund designated as the "Special Fund" or
the "Combined Injury Fund" and whenever reference is made elsewhere in
this code to the "Special Fund" or the "Combined Injury Fund" that reference shall be deemed to be the Second Injury Fund. The state treasurer
shall be the custodian of the Second Injury Fund and the commission shall
direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistance may be paid
from the proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to represent the Second Injury Fund in all proceedings
brought to enforce claims against it.
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six years from the date of
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in § 35-1-81, and further benefits in the
amounts and to the persons as follows:
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the
date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers'
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in the Uninsured Employers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereafter
be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the Uninsured
Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time after reaching the
initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into either the
Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may be
required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or
due the deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a
dependency claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order
and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made by the commission, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to
the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the
employer or insurance carrier before any further claim may be asserted
against the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is
filed within one year from the date of death, the commission's temporary order shall become permanent and final. If no temporary order
has been issued and no claim for dependency has been filed within one
year from the date of death, the commission may issue a permanent
order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay $30,000 into
the Second Injury Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of
death of the deceased.
(b) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons 'at the time of the
death, the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be
66%% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the

injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a
minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but
not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of the death and not to
exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury.
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during
dependency following the expiration of the first six-year period
described in Subsection (2) (b) (i) shall be an amount equal to the
weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during
that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal
social security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the
commission at the end of the initial six-year period and annually
thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the
facts and circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered
a partly dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such
benefits as the commission may determine pursuant to Subsection
(2) (c) (ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving
spouse of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be
wholly dependent for a six-year period from the date of death of the
employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial sixyear period and, in determining the then existing annual income
of the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any %
federal social security death benefits received by that surviving
spouse,
(c) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death,
the payment shall be 662/3% of the decedent's average weekly I
wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per
week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, to continue
during dependency for the remainder of the period between the
date of death and not to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the
date of injury as the commission in each case may determine and
shall not amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the
circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of

injury, and any amount awarded by the commission under this
subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this
title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pursuant to Subsection (2) (b) (iii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of the dependency review and may be
paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate
that partly dependent person would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons
during their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier.
(d) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent
persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits
awarded to all parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum provided for by law.
(e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its
insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency, including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed $30,000,
the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between !
the amount paid and $30,000 into the Second Injury Fund provided for J
in Subsection (1).
!
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anility — £ uncling — Administration — Subrogation — Insolvent employer — Fund's rights
with wrongful act or neglect — Adjusting
claims — Duty to notify — Penalty — Assessment of self-insured employers.
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for the purpose of
paying and assuring, to persons entitled to workers' compensation benefits
when every employer of the claimant who is found to be individually,
jointly, or severally liable becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance,
sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities under
this chapter. This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is
liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2,
Title 35, with the exception of penalties on those obligations.
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided pursuant
to Subsections 35-1-68 (2) (a) and 31A-3-201 (2). The state treasurer is the
custodian of the Uninsured Employers' Fund and the commission shall
direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration may be paid from
the fund. The commission shall employ counsel to represent the Uninsured
Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on
behalf of the fund, and upon the request of the commission, the attorney
general, city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title is pending, or in
which the employee resides or an employer resides or is doing business,
shall aid in the representation of the fund.
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable
to or on behalf of an employee or their dependents from the Uninsured
Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and
benefits of the employee or their dependents against the employer failing to
make the compensation payments.
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The
court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section
a priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in
the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent employer* The
expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority
as the liquidator's expenses.
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or
liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the
covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against
the fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the
assets of the insolvent employer.
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation is payable from the
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same
rights as allowed under § 35-1-62.
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division
of the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting
its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise
and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims.
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon rendering a decision with respect to any claim for benefits under this chapter,
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value
of the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the
additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter.
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(9) The liability of the state, the Industrial Commission, and the state
treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses,
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to
the assets in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the
making of any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and
payment of claims for compensation from the fund.
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers'
Fund to pay benefits pursuant to the provisions of this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured employer, the Uninsured Employers'
Fund may assess all other self-insured employers amounts necessary to pay
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses
of handling covered claims subsequent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of
examinations under Subsection (12), and (d) other expanses authorized by
this section. The assessments of each self-insured employer shall be in the
proportion that the manual premium of the self-insured employer for the
preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium of all self-insured
employers for the preceding calendar year. Each self-insured employer
shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 days before it is due.
No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an amount greater
than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for the preceding
calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in any one year
an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the fund for one
or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid
as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are liable
under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the selfinsured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior
to July 1,1986.
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to jiotify the Industrial
Commission of any information indicating that any sblf-insured •aiployer
may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or
the public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing,
the Industrial Commission may order an examination of that self-insured
employer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all selfinsured employers as provided in Subsection (11). The results of the examination shall be kept confidential.
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Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 45580
160 South 3rd East
SLC
UT. 84145-0580
RE: Claim No:
Inj Date:
Claimant:
Employer:

86-23288-B0
07-31-86
Randi Hale
Hales Sand & Gravel

Enclosed you will find reports and certificates relating to the untimely death
of Randi Hale.
As it appears there are no dependents and claiming benefits. We will await
your order regarding payments to the Default Indemnity Fund.
Very truly yours,
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND

Dean Sanders
Claims Supervisor
Phone: 533-7837
DS/tb
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Of UTAH

EDWARD ALTER, State Treasurer
and Custodian of the UNINSURED
EMPLOYERS* FUND and the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION of UTAH,
Applicants,

HALES SAND AND GRAVEL and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

DEATH BENEFITS ORDER

* *

WHEREAS, Randi (Marvidikis) Hales was fatally injured as the result of an
accident arising out of or in the course of her employment with Hales Sand and
Gravel, on July 31, 1986.
WHEREAS, Section 35-1-68 (2) (a), U. C. A., provides that if the
Commission has reasonably determined that there are no dependents of a
deceased employee, it may issue an Order for the employer or insurance carrier
to pay into the Uninsured Employers* Fund the sum of $30,000.00. In the event
no dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of death, this
Order shall become permanent and final, and
WHEREAS, the Commission has reasonably determined that there are no
dependents and desires to have the statutory amount herein above stated paid
into the Uninsured Employers' Fund, and further, the Commission is of the
opinion that the statutory funeral allowance of $1,800.00 should also be paid,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants pay to the Uninsured
Employers' Fund, c/o Edward Alter, State Treasurer, the sum of $30,000.00 for
the use and benefit of the Uninsured Employers' Fund.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any claim made by undetermined or potential
dependents of the deceased must be made within one year from the date of death

RAND I (MARVIDIKIS) HALES, Deceased
DEATH BENEFITS ORDER
PAGE TWO

or the funds herein ordered paid to the Uninsured Employers* Fund shall become
the property of the Uninsured Employers' Fund without further order of the
Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants pay the statutory funeral
allowance.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this
<%/'*f day of

/&./-/frsr.A/~
^

» 1986.

ATTEST:

' Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary

y^

m e iiMuu^iHiiiL, uunnissiUN OF UTAH
Case No. 860009b2

EDWARD ALTER, State Treasurer,
and Custodian of the
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Applicants,
vs.
HALES SAND AND GRAVEL and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR REVIEW

On or about August 21, 1986, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.
On or about September 9, 1986, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendant, Hales Sand and Gravel, by and through their
attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.

Commission for
The Commission
of the opinion
the Administrathe Findings of

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of August 21, 1986, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

St^pAen M. Hadley
Chairman

/ / " ~ .day of December, 1986.

Linda J
Commiss

rasburg
>cretary

Walter T. Axelgard
Commissioner

L. Nielsen
Commissioner
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